Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Robert Radakovich, individually, and Robert
Radakovich and Ellen R. Radakovich, Trustees of
The Robert Radakovich Marital and Family Trust v.
Mattie Cornaby and Al Cornaby, individuals, and
The William Argyle Cornaby Trust and Mattie
Cornaby Trust, and Jay Barney Cornaby, Dale
Barney, Gaylene C. Rosenthal, and Albert Cornaby,
Trustees: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
D. Scott Crook; Scott M. Ellsworth; Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC; David Maddox; Attorneys for
Appellants.
John H. Romney; Jeffs & Jeffs; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Radakovich v. Cornaby, No. 20050911 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6073

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

fVW^
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, individually, and
ROBERT RADAKOVICH and ELLEN R.
RADAKOVICH, Trustees of THE ROBERT
RADAKOVICH MARITAL AND FAMILY
TRUST,

Appellants' Brief

Plaintiffs/Appellees,

MATTIE CORNABY and AL CORNABY,
individuals, and THE WILLIAM ARGYLE
CORNABY TRUST and MATTIE
CORNABY TRUST, and JAY BARNEY
CORNABY, DALE BARNEY, GAYLENE C.
ROSENTHAL, and ALBERT CORNABY,
Trustees,

Case No. 20050911
District Court No. 020700486

Defendants/Appellants.
Appeal from a Decision of the Seventh Judicial District Court
Judge Bryce K. Bryner
D. Scott Crook (7495)
Scott M.Ellsworth (7514)
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

John H. Romney
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo,Utah 84601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees

215 South State Street, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel. (801) 413-1600
Fax (801) 413-1620
David Maddox (2044)
9160 South 300 West, Suite 6A
Sandy, Utah 84070
Tel. (801) 446-3788
Fax (801) 365-7215
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Cornaby et al.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, individually, and
ROBERT RADAKOVICH and ELLEN R.
RADAKOVICH, Trustees of THE ROBERT
RADAKOVICH MARITAL AND FAMILY
TRUST,

Appellants' Brief

Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v.
MATTIE CORNABY and AL CORNABY,
individuals, and THE WILLIAM ARGYLE
CORNABY TRUST and MATTIE
CORNABY TRUST, and JAY BARNEY
CORNABY, DALE BARNEY, GAYLENE C.
ROSENTHAL, and ALBERT CORNABY,
Trustees,

Case No. 20050911
District Court No. 020700486

Defendants/Appellants.
Appeal from a Decision of the Seventh Judicial District Court
Judge Bryce K. Bryner
D. Scott Crook (7495)
Scott M.Ellsworth (7514)
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

John H. Romney
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601

215 South State Street, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel. (801) 413-1600
Fax (801) 413-1620

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees

David Maddox (2044)
9160 South 300 West, Suite 6A
Sandy, Utah 84070
Tel. (801) 446-3788
Fax (801) 365-7215
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
Cornaby et al.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVHSW
ISSUES
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO CLARIFY

1
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
11
12
12

The Two Rights-of-Way Before the Trial Court were Irreconcilable
12
The Trial Court Failed in its Obligation to Delineate the Right-of-Way it
Bestowed on Radakovich
13
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Failed to Grant Relief under
Rule 60(b)(6)
17
CONCLUSION
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ADDENDUM

jtosi o n e / : / i j o r<r\ nin nm

19
20
21

n~~~ i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Egidiv. Libertyville, 621 N.E.2d615 (111. App. 1993)
15
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2004 UT App 256, 97 P.3d 697
15
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2005 UT 74, 123 P.3d 432 . 15, 16, 17
General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, Both Surface and Underground,
Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit,
Wasatch, Sanpete and Juab Counties in Utah, 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 65
3
Gillmorv. Wright, 850P.2d431 (Utah 1993)
4
Kunglerv.O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
17
Lundv. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997)
3
Mitchell v. Chance, 149 S.W.3d40 (Term. Ct. App. 2004)
15
Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 2003 UT App 46, 68 P.3d 1008
18
Shipmanv. Evans, 2004 UT 44, 100 P.3d 1151
17
Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996)
3
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G)
Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)

3
3
3
4,21
1, 3,4,11, 17,18,21

Other Authorities
Bruce, Jon W., & Ely, James W., Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in and, f 7.02[2][a]
(rev. ed. 2000)
16
Corbin on Contracts, §4.1 (rev. ed. 1993)
16

jt\ri

nt\ns

f\'*p'*

s-<s\ g\1/\ ntkl

T>nnn

1

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated ("UCA") § 78-2-2(3)0). Under UCA § 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court has
transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals, which possesses jurisdiction over matters
so transferred pursuant to UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUES

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the Cornabys' Motion
to Clarify and/or Reconsider its Order of February 24, 2005, granting summary judgment
to Appellees and denying it to the Cornabys, despite the fact that the Order is both
unenforceable and incomplete (R. 399).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"A trial court's 'denial of a motion to reconsider summary judgment [is reviewed]
under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion.'" General
Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, Both Surface and Underground,
Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis,
Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete and Juab Counties in Utah, 1999 UT 39, f22, 982 P.2d 65
(brackets in original) (quoting Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1997) (citing Timm
v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996)). "A trial court's decision to grant or deny
a motion to reconsider summary judgment 'is within the discretion of the trial court,'"
Timm, 921 P.2d at 1386 (emphasis in original); such a decision, however, may be
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reversed or revisited where the trial court has abused its discretion, id. at 1386-87 (citing
Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1312, and Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993)).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah R. Civ. P. ("URCP"), Rules 56(c) "Summary judgment," and 60(b) "Relief
from judgment or order." The full text of these provisions is set forth at Tab A of the
Addendum ("Add.").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

The Cornabys appeal the August 31, 2005, Ruling by Judge Bryce K. Bryner (R.
460-62 (Add., Tab C)) denying a Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider entry of summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees Radakovich,1 and against the Cornabys.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Appellees Radakovich brought suit against the Cornabys in May of 2002 (R. 5-9;
Amended Complaint filed October 2003 (R. 30-35)). The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment in June of 2004 (R. 41 & 89), and the trial court entered a final Order
on February 24, 2005, granting summary judgment to Appellees and denying it to the
Cornabys (R. 308-09 (Add, Tab D)). The Cornabys filed their 60(b) Motion to Clarify
and/or Reconsider on March 14, 2005 (R. 341-42, (Memorandum in Support at pp.34369)), to which Appellees filed a Memorandum in Opposition on March 28, 2005 (R. 386-

1

Appellees, Robert Radakovich and Robert Radakovich and Ellen R. Radakovich
as Trustees of the Robert Radakovich Marital and Family Trust, are herein referred to
collectively as either "Radakovich" or "Appellees."

95). The Cornabys filed a Reply in Support on April 15, 2005 (R. 396-405), and the court
heard oral argument on June 2, 2005. Thereafter, the court received supplemental
memoranda from both parties (R. 448-57 & 421-31). On August 31, 2005, the court
entered a Ruling denying the Cornabys' Motion (R. 460-62 {Add., Tab C)).
The Cornabys filed their Notice of Appeal on September 28, 2005 (R. 463-65;
Add, Tab B).
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2

Two brothers, H.B. and Elrie Simonsen, owned as tenants in common the property
now owned by the Cornabys and the Appellees Radakovich (R. 120 % 2 {Add., Tab G); 3
96 Tf 1; 45 \ 1). In 1955 or '56, the Simonsens agreed on a permanent physical division of
the property (R. 121 f 3 {Add, Tab G); 97 f 2; 45 % 2). They constructed a fence and
agreed that it would mark the division line, the land north of the fence to belong to Elrie
Simonsen, and the land south, to H.B. Simonsen (R. 12 I f 3-4 {Add, Tab G); 97ffif3^1;
45 Tflf 3-4). H.B. Simonsen was also to possess "the non-exclusive right to use the
existing fenced right-of-way traversing the ... north parcel for entry to [and] exit from the

The Cornabys pray the Court's indulgence for this relatively lengthy Statement of
Fact. It should be borne in mind that the Cornabys do not challenge the trial court's
decision, only its refusal to reconsider or clarify it. A proper understanding of the context
and ramifications of the trial court's refusal, however, requires the methodical narration
of the particulars set out in this Statement of Facts.
Record pages 120-24 {Add., Tab G) are the Findings and Conclusions entered in
Radakovich v. Simonsen (7th District, No. 9439) in January of 1969, Radakovich's first
(unsuccessful) attempted to enlarge his estate through reinterpretation of his deed.
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... south parcel" (R. 121 If 3 (Add, Tab G); 110 f 1 (Add, Tab H); 4 97 % 4).
In 1957, H.B. Simonsen, then president of the Helper State Bank, prepared the
reciprocal quitclaim deeds dividing the property (R. 121 f 5 (Add., Tab G); 111 f 3
(Add., Tab H); 46 ^ 5). The instruments he prepared described the right-of-way as
follows:
Beginning at a point on the North line of the ... [southern, H.B. Simonsen]
tract of land, which point is 835 feet North and 787 feet West of the
Southeast corner of the SW% of the NWVi of Section 5, Township 13
South, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence North 485
feet more or less to the County Road; thence East 60; thence South 490 feet
more or less to the North line of said above described tract of land; thence
Northwesterly along said North line of said described tract of land 61 feet
more or less to the point of beginning.
(R. 169.) As H.B. Simonsen described it in the
reciprocal deeds, however, his north property
line—that is, the line between the two
brothers' respective parcels—did not follow
the agreed-upon fence line boundary (R. 121 f

5(Add,TabG)).
Simple geometr> places the described
line far north of the fence line, falling at a
much steeper slope northwest to southeast

4
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this image shows the two parcels, the
listing fenced right-of-way, and the
county road to which it connects, as they
existed on September 30, 1997. (From
http://terraserver.com) (cf. R. 288-89).

Record pages 110-12 (Add., Tab H) are the Memorandum Decision entered in
Radakovich v. Simonsen (7th District, No. 9439) in December of 1968.

than the fence line (compare R. 402-05 with R. 294-95). As a result, the 490-foot-long,
60-foot-wide right-of-way described in the deeds falls about 400 feet shy of the fence line
that is the actual northern boundary of what would be the dominant estate if the right-ofway actually connected with it (R. 402-05). In addition, the right-of-way as described in
the deeds doesn't follow the line of the existing right-of-way; the former extends directly
northward from its sole intersection with the latter, at the existing, fenced right-of-way's
northern end. The fenced right-of-way varies in width, but is nowhere wider than about
50 feet (again, compare R. 402-05
60-foot right-of-way
as described ill 1957
and 1997 deeds

with R. 287-95).

NORTH i f

Unaware of the botched
descriptions in the deeds, however,
both of the Simonsen brothers and
their families continued to use their
respective parcels according to
their original oral understanding,
treating the fence line as the
division between their properties
and using the existing fenced right-

Radakovkh Properly

of-way for access (R. 122 fflj 6-7
123112(iW</.,TabG)).
Tn
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Figure 2. Again, for illustrative purposes only, this
graphic shows the approximate, relative positions
of the existing fenced right-of-way and the right-of
wa
^ as described in the reciprocal Simonsen and
Simonsen-Radakovich deeds, (ct R. 287-95; 405.)

ignorant of the inconsistencies between the original intent and the deeds he had drawn up,
H.B. Simonsen sold the south parcel to Robert Radakovich (R. 117-18, 122 % 8 {Add,
Tab G)). The warranty deed included the erroneous description appearing on the 1957
quitclaim deeds (R. 117; 122 \ 8 {Add., Tab G)). Unlike the Simonsen brothers, though,
Radakovich had examined both the property and the deed description and was well aware
of the discrepancy when he purchased the south parcel (R. 122-23 ^f 9 {Add., Tab G)). In
January 1968, pointing to the erroneous description, Radakovich sued Elrie and Bertha
Simonsen, seeking to lay claim to a larger parcel than H.B. Simonsen had sold him (R.
70-71; 111 f 4 {Add, Tab H); 123 1 1 {Add, Tab G)), despite the fact that both
Simonsen brothers and their families had always treated the fence line as the boundary
and had always used the existing fenced right-of-way for access (R. I l l fflf 2, 3, & 4
{Add, Tab H); 122 f t 6-7; 123 f 12 {Add, Tab G)).
On December 24, 1968, the Seventh District Court handed down a Memorandum
Decision (R. 110-12; Add., Tab H) in which it ruled against Radakovich. In the present
action, the 1968 Memorandum Decision ruled on the right-of-way thus:
It was agreed between H[.B.] Simonsen and Elrie Simonsen ... that the land
lying north of said fence line should belong to Elrie Simonsen and the land
lying south thereof should belong to H[.B.] Simonsen with the further
proviso that H[.B.] Simonsen should have the non-exclusive right to use the
existing fenced right of way traversing the ... north parcel for entry to [and]
exit from the said south parcel.
... [I]t follows that the defendants [Elrie and Bertha Simonsen] are
entitled to a decree against plaintiffs [Robert and Ellen Radakovich]
quieting defendants' title to the land lying north of the said division line,
subject nevertheless to plaintiffs' right to use the said right of way.
(R. 110 If 1, & 111-12 {App., Tab H) (emphasis added).) The "said right of way" in the

last paragraph is "the existing fenced right of way traversing the ... north parcel" in the
first. The 1969 Findings and Conclusions contain much the same language (R. 121 %3
(App., Tab G)), but also declare that
A fenced right of way exists and has existed for many years across the
north parcel which serves both parcels for entry and exit.
Defendants [Elrie and Bertha Simonsen] are entitled to a decree of
the court quieting their title to the land [north of the dividing line] ...
against plaintiffs [Radakovich] and all persons claiming by, through or
under them subject, however, to the right in plaintiffs to use the said fenced
right of way in common with defendants to serve their said parcel.
(R. 123 W 12 (finding) & 2 (conclusion) (App., Tab G) (emphasis added).) Note, again,
that the "said fenced right of way" in the last paragraph refers to the "fenced right of
way" named in the first paragraph and which has long existed over the northern parcel.
On June 23, 1972, Elrie and Bertha Simonsen conveyed their interest in the north
parcel to Mattie and William Cornaby (R. 114-15). The 1972 quitclaim deed correctly
described the existing fenced right-of-way across the north parcel consistent with the
1969 court ruling:
the non-exclusive right in Robert Radakovich and Ellen R. Radakovich,
husband and wife, their successors and assigns to use the fenced right of
way over and across said parcel for entry to and exit from their lands within
the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 5, township 13
south, range 7 east of the Salt Lake meridian.
(R. 114.) This fenced right-of-way, which has always been used for entry to and exit from
both parcels, has never been moved, and remains today in the same location in which it
lay at the time of the 1972 conveyance and the 1969 Findings and Conclusions (R. 49 Tf
24; 99 Tf 11; 307 ^f 7). Neither the Simonsen brothers nor Radakovich (nor, of course, the
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Cornabys) has ever recognized the 60-foot right-of-way described in the Simonsens'
reciprocal deeds and perpetuated in H.B. Simonsen's deed to Radakovich: only the
fenced right-of-way, which has existed since before the separation of the parcels in 1957,
has ever been used to access the south parcel (R. 242fflf4-7; 244fflf4-7; 246fflf4-7; 248
Tit 3-6; 402-05).
In December of 1997, by means of a "Correctional Warranty Deed, Robert
Radakovich conveyed his interest in the south parcel to the trustees of the Ellen R.
Radakovich Marital and Family Trust (R. 130-31). In this deed, Radakovich completely
ignored the 1969 ruling and included the original, erroneous 60-foot right-of-way
description (id.).
The present case arose in May of 2002, when Radakovich again brought suit,
attempting again to use H.B. Simonsen's erroneous description as leverage to enlarge his
estate with a 60-foot-wide right-of-way (R. 30-35fflf2, 5, & 8). 5 The trial court ruled in
favor of Radakovich and against the Cornabys: "The deeds referred to in plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment and the four undisputed affidavits furnished by plaintiffs
establish the right of way as being 60' in width." (R. 299-300; Add, Tab C; cf. R. 3065

Radakovich's original Complaint (R. 1-6) explicitly admitted that the ruling in
the 1968 dispute (Radakovich v. Simonsen (7th District, No. 9439)) "determined that the
plaintiffs' predecessors in interest ... were entitled to a right-of-way" (R. 2 \ 4). In order
to avoid res judicata, however, Radakovich deleted this allegation from his Amended
Complaint, although the only substantive justification offered for the amendment was the
addition of the Cornaby Trusts (R. 23). The right-of-way was not mentioned in
Radakovich's Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Amend, however (R. 21-24); all
that is there stated is that "[t]he amended Complaint also contains further allegations
which clarify and further explain the basis for the Complaint" (R. 23). Removal of a fatal
admission, though, is not a "further allegation."

07 Iflj 7-14 (Findings) & 6-7 (Conclusions); Add Tab E.) Problematically, of course, the
trial court's Ruling, Findings and Conclusions, and Order, although they take pains to
discuss the existence and width of the right-of-way claimed by Radakovich, say nothing
at all about its location. Indeed, the right-of-way created by the trial court is entirely
unworkable: it is worthless where the erroneous deed language places it, but it is
unplottable where Radakovich wishes it drawn, since no description exists defining its
situation. The Cornabys filed a 60(b) Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider on March 14,
2005 (R. 312-13), offering the trial court a chance to explain its Ruling.
From the trial court's denial of their Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider (R. 46062, Add. Tab C), the Cornabys appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused the Cornabys' invitation under
Rule 60(b)(6) to reconsider and clarify its grant of unclear and internally inconsistent
summary judgment to Radakovich. The court's Ruling, Findings and Conclusions, and
Order conflated two irreconcilable rights-of-way: that appearing in the Simonsen-toRadakovich deed—a description neither correct nor workable—and the fenced right-ofway which has existed for many years. By so doing, the trial court created a 60-foot-wide
right-of-way without any specific boundaries or baseline from which to be measured.
Moreover, the trial court empowered Radakovich, the owner of the dominant estate, to
select the boundaries of this new right-of-way wherever he desires them. The law is clear,
however, that the power to fix the location of undescribed servitudes belongs with the

dR'si-RQRt-ni's? rnnmnni

Pnooii

owner of the servient estate—the Cornabys, in this case. In addition, failure to rectify an
erroneous easement description in a judgment is a recognized abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO CLARIFY
ITS GRANT TO RADAKOVICH OF A FORMLESS, PLACELESS RIGHT-OF-WAY
ACROSS THE CORNABYS' LAND.

—I—
The Two Rights-of-Way Before the Trial
Court were Irreconcilable.
Although Radakovich would wish it otherwise, this dispute brought before the trial
court two different rights-of-way: the right-of-way appearing in the reciprocal Simonsen
deeds and the "fenced right of way ... [that] has existed for many years across the
[Cornabys5] north parcel [and] which serves both parcels for entry and exit" (R. 123 1} 12,
App. Tab G). The fenced right-of-way—an unpaved road more than half a century old—
branches off southwesterly from the county road to the north {see Figures 1 & 2, above),
across a culvert, and so on down through the Cornabys' land to that of Radakovich (R.
284-95). The right-of-way described in the 1964 Simonsen-to-Radakovich deed (R. 117—
18; see Figure 2, above), on the other hand, touches the fenced right-of-way only at its
own southern end, begins at a non-existent boundary line, runs straight north "485 feet
more or less" (R. 169) across a stream (there is no bridge), across the county road to
which it is supposed to lead, and on several hundred feet further, where it ends in an
empty field.
The self-evident uselessness of the Simonsen-Radakovich right-of-way is belied

by the ferocity with which Radakovich has pursued it. Evidently believing he could claim
the width and leave the location, Radakovich laid vehement claim to this pointless
servitude in his argument for summary judgment:
It is[, argued Radakovich,] an undisputed fact that Elrie Simonsen deeded a
sixty foot right of way to H.B. Simonsen in 1957. The Defendants have ...
presented no admissible evidence to dispute the fact that H.B. Simonsen
deeded the same 60 foot wide right of way to the Plaintiff in 1964. It is an
undisputed fact that H.B. Simonsen deeded the exact same 60 foot wide
right of way to the Plaintiff, Robert Radakovich, in 1964.
(R. 161 (citations omitted, emphasis added).) By claiming "the exact same" right-of-way,
Radakovich has essentially demanded, and obtained, what amounts to a sort of pointless
easement in gross—a 500-foot trapezoid, 60 feet wide, upon which he and his can wander
perforce aimlessly, since it doesn't go anywhere.
From its description, this impractical right-of-way plainly has nothing to do with
the existing fenced right-of-way (save for a few hundred square feet of overlap far from
the Cornaby-Radakovich boundary line). Unlike its pointless counterpart, the fenced
right-of-way was worn into the landscape decades ago by generations of hooves, feet, and
wheels. The fenced right-of-way, as practical as its would-be doppelganger is quixotic,
runs from the actual boundary between the two parcels to the county road, passing only
briefly through the bizarre boundaries of the Radakovich right-of-way.
The two cannot be reconciled ... nor were they.
— II —
The Trial Court Failed in its Obligation to Delineate
the Right-of-Way it Bestowed on Radakovich.
In its February 1, 2005, Ruling, the trial court declared that "[t]he deeds referred to

in plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the four undisputed affidavits furnished
by plaintiffs establish the right of way as being 60' in width" (R. 300; App. Tab F). The
derivative Findings and Conclusions echo this determination (although surreptitiously
attempting to divorce themselves from the aimless deed description): "The deeds referred
to in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment establish the existing right of way as
being sixty (60) feet in width throughout its length" (R. 306 ^ 11; App. Tab E).6 The
"deeds referred to," however, have nothing to do with the placement of the existing
fenced right-of-way; they refer without exception to the useless construct unintentionally
created by H.B. Simonsen in 1957. And the "four undisputed affidavits" upon which the
court relied include only vague estimates as to width; they say nothing at all about where
along its length the right-of-way was 60 feet wide (R. 186ffl[5 & 8; 188fflj5 & 7; 190 ffi[
5 & 7; 192 Ifif 5 & 7; cf. R. 284-295, esp. photo on 288, 295).
What the trial court has done, in short, is grant to Radakovich a right-of-way, 60
feet wide (based upon the spurious deed description) along the length of the existing
fenced right-of-way (which has not historically been of a uniform 60-foot width
throughout), without bothering to specify where this 60 feet is to be measured from. In
this, the trial court erred grievously. Are the parties to measure the mandated 60 feet, for
6

Interestingly, by the time one works from the trial court's Ruling to the Findings
and Conclusions prepared by Radakovich, and thence to the Order (also prepared by
Radakovich), the deed description under which Radakovich marched at the outset of the
litigation has been skillfully diluted until it no longer remains. The February 24, 2005,
Order states blandly, "The right of way which now exists and has existed for many years,
and which provides access to the Plaintiffs' property over Defendants' property, is
confirmed as and shall be sixty feet wide throughout its length" (R. 309 f 5; App. Tab
D). The subtlety is impressive, but this is not what the trial court ruled.

instance, as 30 feet on either side of the centerline of the existing access road? or 60 feet
from the eastern boundary? or 30 feet on either side of a line drawn at the whim of
Radakovich? This point, unaddressed by the trial court, should be the main priority in a
dispute over the location of an undescribed right-of-way.
Only recently, the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme Court addressed the
question of unplotted servitudes. The Court of Appeals addressed the issue in July of
2004, in Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2004 UT App 256, 97
P.3d 697. Evans turned on the validity of a reserved easement the location of which was
not described in the original reservation. The trial court ruled the easement invalid, but
the Utah Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that "[t]he failure of an easement
description to specify details, such as the exact location ... does not render the easement
excessively vague or unenforceable." 2004 UT App 256, ^[ 10 (quoting Egidi v.
Libertyville, 621 N.E.2d 615, 622 (111. App. 1993)).7
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of
Utah County, 2005 UT 74, 123 P.3d 432, endorsing the principle that,
[a]lthough certainly desirable in most instances, language fixing the
location of an easement is not always necessary when other terms of the

7

Relevant to the present dispute was the Court of Appeals' observation that
"[w]hen a deed creating an easement explicitly refers to an existing road, the courts
commonly construe the location and dimensions of the intended easement to conform
with the location and dimensions of the road." 2004 UT App 256, ^[12 (quoting Mitchell
v. Chance, 149 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). In the present case, of course, the
trial court did not construe the right-of-way to conform with the dimensions of the
existing road, but instead redefined the existing road to conform with its reading of the
right-of-way.

easement safeguard the servient estate from the risk that its burden may be
greater than that for which it bargained.
2005 UT 74 at \ 13 (emphasis added). The Court noted, in addition, that when confronted,
as in Evans, with a
sizeable quantity of evidence firmly establishing] an intent to create an
easement and unambiguously defining] all essential features of the
servitude except its location. . . . [the Courts] have an obligation to explore
whether the deed's failure to identify the location of the easement can be
remedied without altering in any material way the bargain struck between
the grantor and grantee.
Id. at TJ16. The Court characterized the judicial function in unfixed easement cases as an
exercise similar to contractual "gap-filling." Id. (citing Corbin on Contracts, § 4.1 (rev.
ed. 1993)). Ultimately, after considering the necessity of ensuring that judicial gapfilling does not alter the scope of the servitude bargained for, id. at ^f 19, the Court
adopted an approach that places the power to locate an unfixed servitude in the owner of
the servient estate, id. at f20. Under this "practical approach to the problem," the Court
observed,
the owner of the servient estate is entitled to designate a reasonable location
for the easement. If the servient owner fails to make such a designation
within a reasonable period, the easement holder may select a reasonable
route. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, a court may specify a
location for the easement.

8

"If the parties have concluded a transaction in which it appears that they intend
to make a contract, the court should not frustrate their intention if it is possible to reach a
fair and just result, even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings and
the filling of some gaps that the parties have left." Corbin on Contracts, § 4.1 (rev.
ed.1993).

Id. at f21 (quoting Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and
Licenses in Land, ^f 7.02[2][a] (rev. ed. 2000)). This arrangement for the placement of an
unfixed servitude, the Court concluded, "removes the issue of whether location selection
is an essential term from the field of battle with neither side sustaining injury." Id. at 19.
Thus, in the present dispute, the Cornabys' quarrel is not with the enforcement of
an unfixed right-of-way, but with the trial court's failure to have fulfilled its gap-filling
duty under the Evans rule. Given that Cornaby and Radakovich cannot reach an
agreement as to the situation of the right-of-way, the trial court's duty was to specify a
location. This, however, the trial court utterly failed to do.
— Ill —
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it
Failed to Grant Relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
In its August 31, 2005, Ruling denying the Cornabys' 60(b)(6) Motion to Clarify
and/or Reconsider, the trial court commented,
Although ... the Supreme Court of Utah ... acknowledge^] that
"extraordinary circumstances may arise when it is appropriate to request a
trial court to reconsider a ruling[,]" ... the court cannot find that
extraordinary circumstances exist in this case that would justify a
reconsideration.
(R. 460; Add Tab C (quoting Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, f 18 n.5, 100 P.3d 1151).)
In other words, the trial court concluded that the confusion in the description of the
easement was not a reason justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The trial court, however,
was mistaken.
This Court has already determined that a mistaken easement description in a
judgment constitutes a "reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." In

Kungler v. O M , 855 P.2d 270, 274-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Court upheld a trial
court's clarification of a judgment when it had misdescribed the easement;
The record clearly shows the court thought it was entering a judgment
factually consistent with its legal ruling that the historical width of the
easement was from the fence line as it existed at the time of the trial to the
quarter-section line. It was not until the appellants surveyed the land and
moved the fence line that the court or parties realized the judgment did not
accurately memorialize the court's legal determination. At the clarification
hearing, the trial court explained why it described the west boundary of the
easement as being sixteen feet west of the quarter-section line in its original
judgment. The court, without the benefit of a survey, relied on an erroneous
exhibit that both parties testified from to conclude the quarter-section line
was sixteen feet east of the fence line. . . .
. . . . The judge specifically found in its new judgment and order that
the reason for the revision was "to make factually correct the description"
and "to conform to the Court's ruling that the easement was from the West
Boundary of the Plaintiffs property up to where the fence existed at the
time of Trial" (the historical location). The court's factual description of its
legal ruling was based on evidence submitted and relied on by both parties.
That evidence was later found to be erroneous, making the factual
description of the legal ruling incorrect. The legal ruling remained intact;
the memorialization of it in the judgment no longer was. Both parties
motioned the court to clarify the now unclear judgment. We believe the
correcting of the judgment was a justifiable reason to change the original
order under Rule 60(b).
In the present case, of course, the Comabys sought remediation of the trial court's
judgment less than a three weeks after the entry of the court's Findings and Conclusions
and Order. If correction under 60(b)(6) is proper after many months, as in Kungler, it is
certainly proper here:
When the trial court's mistakes—not counsel's—are the reason a judgment
is improvidently entered ... the court should be anxious to do whatever
needs to be done to fix the mistake as soon as it is called to the court's
attention. It did not do so here. The trial court thus exceeded the bounds of
sound discretion in denying [the Comabys'] motion under rule 60(b)(6) for
relief from judgment.

Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46, f 12, 68 P.3d 1008.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's failure to grant the Cornabys relief pursuant to their Rule 60(b)(6)
Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider constituted a clear abuse of discretion. For the
reasons given herein, the Cornabys respectfully request that this Court (1) reverse the trial
court's August 31, 2005, Order denying the Cornabys' Motion, (2) set aside the
judgment, and (3) remand this matter to the trial court to specifically identify the location
of the right-of-way at issue.

DATED

this fi^ day of January, 2006,

i*-*C&u~~o
D. Scott Croot
Scott M. Ellsworth
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

Attorneys for Defendants
David Maddox
Attorney for Defendants
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John H. Romney
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

D. Scott Crook'
Scott M. Ellsworth
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

ADDENDUM
The following documents are attached:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) and 60(b)

Tab A

Notice of Appeal, September 28, 2005.

Tab B

Ruling on Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider, August 31, 2005.

Tab C

Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and Denying Defendants' Countermotion
for Summary Judgment, February 24, 2005.

Tab D

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, February 24, 2005.

Tab E

Ruling on Motions for Summary judgment, February 1, 2005.

Tab F

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed February 3, 1969, in
Radakovich v. Simonsen (Seventh District Court, No. 9439).

TabG

Memorandum Decision, filed December 24, 1968, in
Radakovich v. Simonsen (Seventh District Court, No. 9439).

TabH

Tab A

URCP Rule 56, Summary judgment
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order,
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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D. Scott Crook (7495)
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CORNABY, individuals, and WILLIAM ARGYLE CORNABY TRUST and MATTIE
CORNABY TRUST, JAY BARNEY CORNABY, DALE BARNEY, GAYLENE C.
ROSENTHAL, ALBERT CORNABY, TRUSTEES, by and through their attorneys of
record, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the Ruling on Motion to Clarify and/or
Reconsider entered by the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner on August 31, 2005. Appeal is
taken from the entire order.
DATED this 7-l^day of September, 2005.
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
:
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT RADOKOVICH, individually )
and ROBERT RADAKOVICH and
ELLEN RADAKOVICH TRUSTEES
)
OF THE ROBERT RADAKOVICH
MARITAL AND FAMILY TRUST,
;
Plaintiffs,

AUG 3 1 ?P 5

RULING ON MOTION
TO CLARIFY AND/OR
RECONSIDER

]

VS.

]

MATTIE CORNABY and AL
CORNABY, et al.
Defendants.

)1

Case No. 020700486

)1

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

The court issued a ruling on the parties' respective motions for summary judgment on
January 31, 2005, and directed plaintiffs' counsel to prepare a summary judgment consistent with
the ruling. A Summary Judgment was signed by the court on February 24, 2005, after the
defendants' time to object had expired. On March 14, 2005, the defendants filed a Motion to
Clarify and/or Reconsider to which the plaintiffs filed an Objection. A Reply was filed and the
court heard oral argument on June 2, 2005, and allowed both counsel additional time to submit
additional memorandum. The court took the Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider under
advisement and the matter is ripe for decision.
Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize motions to reconsider, the
Supreme Court of Utah in Shipman v. Evans, 100 P.3d 1151, n. 5. (Utah 2004), acknowledged
that "extraordinary circumstances may arise when it is appropriate to request a trial court to
reconsider a ruling." However, the court cannot find that extraordinary circumstances exist in this
case that would justify a reconsideration. The Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider is denied.

DATED this 31st day of August, 2005.
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JOHN H. ROMNEY, #9160
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, individually and
ROBERT RADAKOVICH and ELLEN R.
RADAKOVICH TRUSTEES OF THE
ROBERT RADAKOVICH MARITAL AND
FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
STRIKE, AND DENYING
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERMOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
MATTIE CORNABY, AL CORNABY,
individuals, and WILLIAM ARGYLE
CORNABY TRUST and
MATTIE CORNABY TRUST, and JAY
BARNEY CORNABY, DALE BARNEY,
GAYLENE C. ROSENTHAL, ALBERT
CORNABY, TRUSTEES

Case No. 020700486
Judge Bryce K. Bryner

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court on oral arguments on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court having heard oral arguments of the parties, having reviewed the memoranda filed on this

matter by both parties, having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, having reviewed
the relevant facts and case law, and otherwise being fully advised in the premise, now ORDERS,
ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;

2.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby is granted as to

paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15;
3.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Supplemental Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby is granted;

4.

Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied;

5.

The right of way which now exists and has existed for many years, and which

provides access to the Plaintiffs' property over the Defendants' property, is confirmed as and shall
be sixty feet wide throughout its length;
6.

Plaintiffs are entitled to construct fences marking the sixty foot wide right of way

from the entrance of the right of way to the point at which it accesses Plaintiffs5 property;
7.

Defendants are ordered to remove any obstacles impeding or lying in the sixty foot

wide right of way;
8.

Defendants are to pay Plaintiffe' costs in the amount of $225.81.

DATED and SIGNED this pij

day of February, 2005.
BY THE COURT

"^). ^<a£^ ^\^^^y^f^
Approved as to Form:

David Maddox

Ju3ge Bry/e K. Bryner
//
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JOHN H. ROMNEY, #9160
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT RADAKOVICH, individually and
ROBERT RADAKOVICH and ELLEN R.
RADAKOVICH TRUSTEES OF THE
ROBERT RADAKOVICH MARITAL AND
FAMILY TRUST,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MATTIE CORNABY, AL CORNABY,
individuals, and WILLIAM ARGYLE
CORNABY TRUST and
MATTIE CORNABY TRUST, and JAY
BARNEY CORNABY, DALE BARNEY,
GAYLENE C.
ROSENTHAL, ALBERT
CORNABY, TRUSTEES

Case No. 020700486
Judge Bryce K. Bryner

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on oral arguments on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment. The

Court heard oral arguments of the parties, reviewed the memoranda filed on this matter by both
parties, reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, made its rulings dated the 31st day of January
2005. The Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, and denied the Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court has considered all memoranda submitted by the parties, the arguments presented at
hearing, the relevant case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter and
having issued its Memorandum Decision on January 31, 2005, now issues the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Paragraphs 7 and 11 of the Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby are conclusory and are not

supported by specific evidentiary facts.
2.

Paragraphs, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15 are conclusory, are not supported by specific

evidentiary facts, and are not based on personal knowledge.
3.

The Supplementary Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby does not effect paragraphs 7,8,9,10,

11, 12, 14 and 15 of the original Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby and is self-serving.
4.

The Warranty Deed from H.B. Simonsen to the Robert Radakovich conveyed real

property, together with a 60 foot right of way.
5.

In 1968, a dispute arose between Robert Radakovich and Elrie Simonsen regarding

the location of the division line between their properties.
6.

The width of the right of way at issue in this litigation was not addressed, nor was it

in dispute in the 1968 litigation.
2

7.

The issue presented for determination by the court in 1968 was the location of the

division line between the two properties, not the width of the right of way.
8.

The only issue addressed by the court was the division line between the north properly

(owned by Elrie and Bertha Simonsen) and the south property (owned by H.B. Simonsen's successor,
Robert Radakovich).
9.

The width of the right of way issue presented in this litigation is not identical to the

issue presented in the 1968 litigation.
10.

The width of the right issue presented in this litigation was not completely, fully and

fairly litigated in the 1968 litigation.
11.

The deeds referred to in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment establish the

existing right of way as being sixty (60) feet in width throughout its length.
12.

The Affidavits in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment establish the

existing right of way as being sixty (60) feet in width throughout its length.
13.

The 1968 court referred to a "fenced right of way" for convenience purposes only, and

not as a limitation as to the width of the right of way.
14.

There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the sixty (60) foot width of the right

of way.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15 and 11 of the Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby

should be stricken.
3

2.

The Supplementary Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby should be stricken.

3.

The issue preclusion branch of res judicata does not apply to the present litigation.

4.

The claim preclusion branch of res judicata does not apply to the present litigation.

5.

The Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.

6.

Because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the sixty (60) foot wide

right of way, the Plaintiffs' are entitled to summary judgment.
7.

The right of way which now exists and has existed for many years, and which provides

access to the Plaintiffs' property over the Defendants' property, is confirmed as and shall be sixty feet
wide throughout its length;
8.

Plaintiffs are entitled to construct fences marking the sixty foot wide right of way from

the entrance of the right of way to the point at which it accesses Plaintiffs' property;
9.

Defendants are required to remove any obstacles impeding or lying in the sixty foot

wide right of way;
10.

Defendants are to pay Plaintiffs' costs.

DATED and SIGNED t h i ^ J

day of February, 2005
BY THE COURT

y^y.TT^C^
Approved as to Form:

David Maddox

Judge Bryce K. Bryner
/
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ROBERT RADOKOVICH, individually
and ROBERT RADAKOVICH and
ELLEN R. RADAKOVICH TRUSTEES )
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RULING ON MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

;

vs.

;

MATTIE CORNABY and AL
CORNABY, et al.
Defendants.

])

Case No. 020700486

])

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 7, 2004, to which the
defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition. A Reply was filed by the plaintiffs. The
defendants filed a Counter Motion for Summary Judgment and the plaintiffs filed a Memorandum
in Opposition to which the defendants filed a Reply. The court heard oral on both motions for
summary judgment, took the motions under advisement, and now issues the following rulings:
I. Relief Requested
The plaintiffs' motion requests the court to: (1) confirm the existence of a sixty foot rightof-way in favor of the plaintiffs; (2) order the defendants to allow the plaintiffs to construct
fences marking the sixty foot right of way; (3) order the defendants to remove any obstacles
impeding the sixty foot wide right of way; (4) award costs; and (5) to grant any other and further
relief as may be proper.
The defendants' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment requests the court to: (1) dismiss
the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on the basis that all issues in dispute pursuant to the
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) deny

plaintiffs' Motion for summary Judgment; (3) for costs and expenses; and (4) for such other and
further relief as may be just and proper in the premises.
II. Ruling
A. Defendantsy Motion for Summary Judgment The defendants claim that res judicata
preludes the relief quested by the plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint. The court finds that the
doctrine of res judicata does not apply to this case because the issue of the size of the right of
way was not addressed in the 1968 litigation. A close reading of the memorandum decision
reveals that the court was not determining the size or the location of the right of way. The issue
presented for determination by the court in 1968 was the location of the division line between the
two properties. Although the court in its decision acknowledged the existence of a right of way
which was located between two fence lines, it did not address the width of Ihe right of way
because the width was not in issue. The only issue addressed by the court was the division line
between the north property (owned by Elrie and Bertha Simonsen) and the south property (owned
by H.B. Simonsen's successor, Robert Radakovich).
Specifically, the second element of issue preclusion requires that the issue decided in the
prior adjudication be identical to the one presented in the first action. Because the width of the
right of way was not litigated in the 1968 lawsuit, but is the subject of the present litigation,
defendants cannot succeed on the claim of issue preclusion, The issue presented in the present
litigation, i.e., the actual width of the right of way, is not identical to the issue presented in the
first action.
The court further finds that an examination of the court's decision in 1968 reveals that not
only was the issue of the width of a right of way not addressed, it was not completely, fully, and
fairly litigated as required by the third element of issue preclusion.
To succeed on claim preclusion the defendants must establish three elements, the second of
which requires the claim that is alleged to be barred to have been presented in the first suit or be
one that could and should have been raised in the first suit. Once again, the court finds that the
issue of the width of the right of way was not presented in the first suit which addressed only the

location of the dividing line between the two properties. As to whether the issue of the right of
way could and should have been presented in the first suit, no evidence has been produced that
the parties had a dispute about the width of the right of way at the time of the first suit. Thus,
there is no evidence that the width of the right of way should have been litigated at the time of
the first suit. Accordingly, the defendants cannot avail themselves of the doctrine of claim
preclusion.
Based on the foregoing the court concludes that res judicata is not applicable under the
circumstances of this case and the defendants' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment on that
basis is denied.
B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment: The plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted for the reason that the court finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, i.e., the width of the right of way. The affidavit of Mattie Cornaby has been stricken
and the defendants have raised no genuine issue of material fact as to the width of the right
of way. The deeds referred to in plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the four
undisputed affidavits furnished by plaintiffs establish the right of way as being 60' in width.
Although the 1968 court referred to the "fenced right of way" for convenience purposes, the
defendants have not produced any evidence that the right of way is not 60' in width.
The plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to
prepare a Summary Judgment in harmony with this ruling.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2005.

3/yce K. Bryner, Judg
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IK THE DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT HADAKOVICH and
RLLEN R. RADAKOVICH,
Husband and W i f e ,

)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

)

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
CARBON COUNTS UTAH

)

**z* F! L E D s s ^
DCC2JI96S

)

BMUB Hi SIMONSEN and
m m m A, SIHONSEN,

5 . H, YOUNG, C U t t K

)
)

Husband and w i f e ,
Defendants.

)

C i v i l No. 9439

MEMORANDUM DECISION

This esse cams n« to b§ heard btfers this court sitting without
a jury at Price, Utah, on tho 16 day of Auguit, 1968, Plaintiff! appeared
in person and by their attorney, Thorit Hatch*. Defendants*appeared in porion
and by their attorney, Thorald N» Jensen, Trial resumed August 21 and con>
cludod August 22. By agreement of\the parties tha court in tht presence of
counsel viewed tho premises on October 3 end counsel*fully argued the caaa
to the court on the following day, October 4.' The court has duly considered
the law And evJdcnco and now states its decision as followst
1

The avidence preponderates to and supports tho conclusion that

ilariia Siru-son, row deceased, *"d his brother, the defendant Klrie Simonson
i- tic ^onr 1955 or 1^56 agrcad on * parmencnt phyiical diviiion between them
o£ tho Southwest Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 13
South, Rango 7 East of tho Salt Lake Meridian in Carbon^County, Utah, which
land was owned by them as tenants in common, and shortly/thereafter they commenced and during that year or the following year complotod the construction
of a substantial fence along tho agreed division line including the installation
of a metal gate, the adjacent posts of which were sot in concrete*

It was

agreed between Harris and Blrie'ilmonion*at the time of said diviiion'that the
land lying north of said fanca U n a anouid beion* to Hirie^imonsen'and the

UfttTlyiin south tthiMO^shiufil belong to H I M I I SlmoniinvVltfi thif!uipbhi*
proviso that^Harris/Siraonaen should have the non-exclusive^right'to^us* the
existing fenoad right ""of way traversing tho said north paroel for" entry to
exit from the said south'psraal>

-*•
2, Thereafter Harrla and Elrie Slaotutn and their vivee Mdt laprovetjt*t« uqw^ ete4 otbtrwUe excitative iy *a*4 «a4 occ*?ic4 U*ir recfective pexcele.
Including the dwelling houaea thereon, and in ail particulara honored the aaid
diviiion ilrii eetabllahed between then. Said conduct continued to the tine aaid
Harrla Simons en and h la wife conveyed to plaintiff! lit November of the year 1964.
3,

In the moantimo the reciprocal quit elate deeds executed and re-

corded between Harrla end Eirle Simon*en on or about December'27, 1957, did not
correctly deecribe the aaid diviaion line ao agreed upon between them and
thereforo did not expreae their true agreement and intent, but the aaid partiea*
aa aforaeeld, continued.to acknowledge and respectaaid fenced diviaion line
during all of the ansulng eeven y«ar* (1957-1964) and up to the data of the
dctad of plalntlffi, each running hit atock and otherwiae excluaivaly uiing and
poeieaeihg hii reepective parcel and the improver^nta thereon^ Said d a e d a l
prepared by Harrla Simonaen; defer^^
tho ield fence line >and did not learn of the error in aaid^cecla, ,at lee it until
the year following the purchaio byplaintifff>from ! ^
1964. |*bm affair• prep^nde^h:ce:r6f; the evidence^Xgaiao^conclwIe^tiJifttiHarriB
8 Itttdnecn did no t Intend tovdeacr ibc"»the proper ty-,wh1lchi<n^

Iain tiff a
.A^J'':

t a l e vni.deecrltbed^iCtne^

4, The plaintiffs prior'and at' the ^tiW^th^y^purch^'ae^d-'froin'^aVria
Simonsen and his wife in the f a l l of 1964 went upon said 'premisesV;Wserved . ^

the laid aubatantiai division line^ffence andogate^rend the defendant! in actual
phyalca1 occupancy, use «nd poiaoeeion;of the land.lying north of aaid fence
line including tho dwelling houie thereon, |FfainllM^
deed from Harrla:Jiiii&hfejn^in&^^
concerning ttiriact'f&at^^
le gal description act- forthStn^the;deedfwhlcb|plaintiffi^receiyed^from;HarriaV
Sitaonaen and hia wife* From thia and other evidence adduced^cbheitide^:(ancV:;:'
hVld ^ a t fiainfcllfe^ M^
of the;relief eoughtby >diefenayn^

V^T/;

Having reached:tn'ecohcluaiona;atated, it:; followa*that^^c;.defenianti
are entitled to a decree agalnat-pialntlffa quieting'defehdahta.v^itie^to.the

•3Land lying north of tho laid diviiion lino, tubjoel;rievortholoiito plaintiffs1
right to uio laid.right of way, On thiir complaint plaintiffs are ontitlad
to a decree againit dafondants quioting their title to the land lying louth
of said diviiion line. Defendant! aro entitled to coiti.
Coumel for defendant! may draw finding! and a decree in harmony
with thii decision.
Done this 4 i^y of November, 1968,

• '

EXHIBIT H

JN THE DISTRICT COURT VITHIH AMD FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT RAOAKOVICH AND
ELLEN R# RAOAKOVICH,
HUSBAND AND WIFE,

5CVIHTH DISTRICT COURT
CARftOM COUNTY, UTAH

-<r, F IIE D *&*•

PLAINTIFFS,

VS.
ELRIE M. SINONSEN AND
BERTHA A, SIMONSEN,
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
DEFENDANTS,

CIVIL NO, 9*39

PtHDIMQS QP FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
THIS CASE CAME OH TO RE HEARD BEFORE THIS COURT SITTING
WITHOUT A UURY AT PRICE, UTAH, ON THE ISTH DAY OF AUGUST,^ 1 9 5 8 .
PLAINTIFFS APPEARED IN PERSON AND BY^THEIR ATTORNEY, THORIT HATCH.
DEFENDANTS APPEARED IN PERSON AND 8Y THEIR ATTORNEY, THERALD N.
UENSEN.

TRIAL RESUMED AUGUST 21ST AMD CONCLUDED AUGUST 22ND.

BY

AGREEMENT OF THE, PARTIES THE COURT;!N THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL VIEWED
THE PREMISES ON OCTOBER 3RD AND*COlN5EL FULLY ARGUED THE CASE TO
THE COURT ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, OCTOBER «»TH.

THE COURT HAS DULY

CuSSlOERCD THE u*W AND EVIDENCE, SIGNED ITS » Ef'ORANDUM DECISION
NOVEM8ER k,

1968 WHICH HAS BEEN DULY ENTERED HEREIN, AND NOW FINDS

AND DECIDES:

jM*wfctt'»«F nror
It

AT ALL TIMES RELEVANT TO THIS ACTION PLAINTIFFS WERE

HUSOANO AND WIFE* AND WERE LIVING TOGETHER IN CARBON COUNTY, UTAH, AS
WERE DEFENDANTS.
2.

THE ,DEFENDANTrELR!'E M. SIMONSEN AND ONE HARRIS

SIMONSEN WERE, BROTHERS.

VOLVED IN THISALAWSUIT*

THEY WERE OWNERS AS TENANTS IN^COrtMON-OF

3,

2 -

THE SAID BROTHERS, HARRIS AND ELRIE SIMONSEN, IN THE

YEAR 1955 OR 1956 ORALLY AGREED ON A PERMANENT PHYSICAL DIVISION
BETWEEN THEM OF THE SAID FORTY ACRE PARCEL AND SHORTLY- THEREAFTER
THEY COMMENCED AND DURING THAT YEAR OR THE FOLLOWING YEAR COMPLETED
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL FENCE ALONG THE AGREED" DIVISION
LINE BETWEEN THEM INCLUDING THE INSTALLATION OF AMETAL GATE, THE
ADJACENT;POSTS OF WHICH WERE SET-IN CONCRETE,,

IT WAS *>RALLY AGREED

BETWEEN HARRIS AND ELRIB SIMONSEN AT THE flME OF SAID DIVISION THAT
THE LAND LYING NORTH OF SAID FENCE LINE SHOULD BELONG TO ELRIE
SIMONSEN AND THE LAND.LYING SOUTH THEREOF SHOULD BELONG TO HARRIS
SIMONSEN WITH THE FURTHER PROVISOTHAT: HARRIS:^/S;iyONSEN;sSHpULfcHAVE
::

* THE W N * E X C L U S | ^
TROVERS INGV THE S A M W ^
SQ^TH;PM : CELr. v
":. •' {V,

•

..

/;;'; \ - - $ € ; V • '•'.-••":'

-^U...

'UPOII;vS^b.;FORTY ACRE- PARCEL AT" 'ffi

-

:

I S I ON WE RE TWO^ELLING^ HOUSES V; ;:'' 'AS;? A %S.ui.r O f ^ T f i i ^ D $ ^
• • UPON /AND EFFECTED};BY^THE|;B;ROTHERS^ ONE;-DWELLING-HOUSE;^

•

v

WiTHIN " THE HARRli> SI"MONV^^^

CINE

AND THE O T H E R ; ^
SAID DIVISION LINE* :'.'',.'"'.,.
.

.

,5';

^\SVZ^--^r^

' ^^•

•'''>•••-^ .

AT THE-'-TIME; Of THE Vs AI D'_ DI VIS I^;;A^C> LNTI L .HI

^HAfmiS^SiMONSB
-UTAH •

HE/pi D:TH£ PAPER\W<^

.:•; -.

THE .S AI D CO-OV/NERS ,';, ^OEFENDANT^EtklE?S IiMONSE& ^ l ^ t | 0 P o C H r s ^ R O T H E R
TO. TAKE- CARE; O ^ a E R I CAL • M A m

AND-l : .

LI VESTOCK,; ^ACCORDINGLY,:^
QUI T: CtXlM DEEDS :DI VI DING/SAI D : FORTY:: AC R E f f ^ l ^
OR. ABOUT DECEMBER 2J
COfttECTl^DESCftlBEi^
• • • • - • - • •
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G,

-

NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY IN DEC-

EMBER OF 1 9 5 7 OF SAID RECIPROCAL DEEDS CONTAINING SAID ERRONEOUS
DESCRIPTIONS THE BROTHERS AND THEIR WIVES CONTINUED TO ACKNOWLEDGE
AND RESPECT THE SAID FENCED DIVISION LINE BETWEEN THEM AT ALL TIMES
DURING THE ENSUING SEVEN YEARS (UNTIL 196«» WHEN HARRIS SIMONSEN
SOLD TO PLAINTIFFS AND WAS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE PARCEL).
DURING THIS SEVEN YEAR PERIOD THE SAID.PARTIES RAN THEIR STOCK UPON,
MADE IMPROVEMENTS UPON AND OTHERWISE EXCLUSIVELY USED AND POSSESSED.
THEIR RESPECTIVE PARCELS AS V.'SLL'.r WH*Wtl%

AND IMPROVEMENTS

THEREON ACCORDING TO SAID FENCED DIVISION LINE.
7r

DEFENDANTS BELIEVED SAID DESCRIPTIONS

SO PREPARED

BY HARRIS SIMONSENFOLLOWED THE S A I D ' - r e N C B J ) ? t l N e : ^ p / O J p - N 6 T ISARN
OF THE ERROR IN SAI D DEEDS AT.LEAST :UNTIL THE?YEAR ;FOLLOWlM* THE .
PURHCASS QY PLAINTIFFS * R M ^
81

IN NOVEMOiirt*^

TEREST IN HIS LANDS IN THE; SCOFI ELD: A R E A ^ l N a ^ ^
SAID FORTY: ACRE P A R C E L / j O ^ P L ^ ^

.

HARRIS S I M O N S E N - j t ^ f # ^
AMONG OTHERS THATJ%OTH;DW^

...

THE XARR-IS'- ilMONSBN D23CRIPfrOKV

PROM A-'PArR^'PSEPbNDERANCK-- OF-ALL-

OF THE EVIDENCE IrPINO THAT HARRIS SIMONSEN IN CONVEY I W TO PLAINTIFFS
DID NOT INTEND TO/EMPLOY THE ^ A I D ; : E R R 6 N E O U S ; DESCRlPTION.fHE WAS NOT
AVAILABLE AS. A.WI TNESS AT .THE, TRIAL HEHAViNG D I E ^ P R I OR' TO THE FI LING. .
OF THE COMPLAINT,
0,

•

/-• "';/•> - ^ / J } ; ^ ;

'"'.'"'

THE PLAINTIFFS P R I O R ? ^ D ; A T

J V - •••'"• ''•'. ' ".' 'J.':'

THE-TIMEVW

FROM HARRIS SIMONSEN AND:>(lS7WIFB IN THE FALL .OF. 196«f WENT UPOti THE
FORTY ACRE PARCEL, OBSERVED THE SUBSTANTIAL DIVISiON U N E ' r e K C E AND^
GATE AND THE DEFENDANTS: IN

A V U A ^ ^

POSSESSION OP THE: LAND LYING NORTH OP SAI DTPENCED LWE^ INCLUDING THE
DWELLtN6;]H0USE THEREON* . AT. THAT TJME P L ^
A D1SCREPENCY QEWSSfelfaEv F E N ^

-;',:,

^'I'AINTttft-;- HOWEVER PORCrtASED^FROM H A R R I S i l l • M O M ' J E ^ A N f c H I S ^ I ^ ^ r . . • ;
•ffWUT^MAfclN^^
• • .•••;*;:' ,;• :• &'•' ••v :M^i';'<*%&\ :v v: • •.,: MWr:
\TH&;D!#M^

^ti¥^^

. 4 -

SCT FORTH IN THS DEED WHICH PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED FROM HARRIS SIMONSCN
AND HIS WfF«5 NOR CONCERNING THE FACT THAT DEFENDANTS WERE LIVING

IN

THE HOUSE NORTH OF SAID FENCED LINE.
10,

THE LAND LYING NORTH OF SAID FENCED DIVISION LINE IS

IN CARBON COUNTY, UTAH AND IS PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT A POINT 5W FEET NORTH OF
THE WEST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 5 ,
TOWNSHIP 13 SOUTH, RANGE 7 EAST OF THE
SALT LAKE MERIDIAN AND RUNNING THENCE
NORTH 775 FEET; THENCE EAST 1320 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 105 3 FEET; THENCE NORTH
78 DEGREES 2G MINUTES WEST 133*» FEET
MORE OR LH^n TO THr r a i H T or ngftfNNINft*

nnnfKKM)

U,

THE LAND LYING SOUTH OF SAID FENCED DIVISION LINC

IS IN CARBON COUNTY, UTAH AND IS PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT A POINT $W FEET NORTH OF
THE WEST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 5 ,
TOWNSHIP 13 SOUTH, RANGE 7 EAST OF THE
SALT LAKE MERIDIAN AND RUNNING THENCE
SOUTH 5W FEET; THENCE EAST 1320 FEET;
THENCE NORTH 26 7 FEET; THENCE NORTH
78 DEGREES 20 MINUTES WEST I33'» FEET
MORE OR LESS TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING,

n**^
12,

A FENCED RIGHT OF WAY EXISTS AND HAS EXISTED FOR

MANY YEARS ACROSS THE NORTH PARCEL WHICH SERVES BOTH PARCELS FOR
ENTRY AND E X I T ,

CONCLUSIONS, OF LAW

AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT
THE COURT DECIDES!
1.

AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS, PLAINTITFS ARE NOT BONA FIDE

PURCHASERS FOR VALU5 OF THE LANCS DESCRIBED IN THEIR COMPLAINT WHICH
LIE NORTH OF SAID FENCED DIVISION LINE.
2,

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE DECREE OF THE COURT

QUIETING THEIR TITLE TO THE LAND DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF THBSB
FINDINGS OF FACT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING BY,
THROUGH OR UNDER THEM SUHUECT, HOWEVER, TO THE RIGHT IN PLAINTIFFS
TO USE THE SAID FENCED RIGHT OF WAY IN COMMON WITH DEFENDANTS TO
S8RV8 THEIR SAID PARCEL.

!«
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